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Abstract
This paper is an exposition of an experiment on revealed preferences, where
we posite a novel discrete binary choice model. To estimate this model, we
use general estimating equations or . This is a methodology originating
in biostatistics for estimating regression models with correlated data. In this
paper, we focus on the motivation for our approach, the logic and intuition
underlying our analysis and a summary of our findings. The missing technical
details, including proofs, are in the working paper by Bunn, et al (2013).
The experimental data is available from the corresponding author: donald.brown@yale.edu. The recruiting poster and the informed consent form are
included as appendices to the section on Experimental Protocols.
JEL Classification: C23, C35, C91, D03
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Introduction

We propose and analyze a revealed preference experiment on fictive learning in choice
under uncertainty, where subjects are oﬀered a sequence of binary choices between
risky and ambiguous binary lotteries. Subjects know the relative frequencies of risky
payoﬀs, but are ignorant of the relative frequencies of ambiguous payoﬀs. Inspired by
Ellsberg’s well known two-urn paradox (1961), where if the risky and ambiguous urn
have the same payoﬀs then optimistic subjects choose the ambiguous urn and pessimistic subjects choose the risky urn, Bracha and Brown (2012) introduced aﬀective
utilities as representations of a subject’s optimism or pessimism in making binary
choices under uncertainty. We assume that subjects are endowed with random utility
functions, where they evaluate risky lotteries with expected utility and ambiguous
lotteries with aﬀective utility. Subjects chose the risky lottery if its expected utility
exceeds the aﬀective utility of the ambiguous lottery by some random threshold.
Each subject’s sequence of binary choices is divided into three phases: prelearning, learning and post-learning. In the learning phase, the payoﬀs of actual and
counterfactual choices are revealed to subjects. No payoﬀs are revealed to subjects
in the pre-learning and the post-learning phases. The subjects in our experiment are
1

Yale undergraduates, randomly assigned to a control group or a treatment group. In
the treatment group, subjects are exposed to the factual and counterfactual payoﬀs of
lotteries in the learning phase, allowing subjects to estimate the relative frequencies
of ambiguous payoﬀs. In the control group, subjects are exposed to noisy factual
and counterfactual payoﬀs of ambiguous lotteries in the learning phase, where they
cannot estimate the relative frequencies of ambiguous payoﬀs.
Conditioning current choices under uncertainty on counterfactual payoﬀs of previous choices, i.e., fictive learning, is well documented in    studies of gambling
behavior in humans – see Lohrenz et al. (2007) and decision-making under uncertainty in monkeys – see Hayden et al. (2009). Recently Boorman et al. (2011)
identified neural circuits for counterfactual payoﬀs and fictive learning. A common
practice in experimental studies of decision-making under uncertainty, such as the
   studies in Huettel et al. (2006) and Levy et al. (2009) is to posit a crosssectional model for the experimental data. Unfortunately, a cross-sectional analysis
ignores that each subject’s repeated binary responses are correlated. In fact, this is
the generic property of most revealed preference experiments in neuroeconomics.
Recently, Li et al. (2008) proposed the longitudinal analysis of neuroimaging data
with general estimating equations (), due to Liang and Zeger (1986) and Zeger
and Liang (1986). Li et al. argue that the existing statistical methods for analyzing
neuroimaging data are primarily developed for cross-sectional neuroimaging studies
and not for panel neuroimaging data. We find this critique of the current practice
in neuroimaging studies equally compelling as a critique of the current statistical
practice in neuroeconomic studies of revealed preferences for risk and ambiguity. To
this end, we propose a marginal longitudinal model of revealed preferences for risk
and ambiguity, where for each subject the covariates in each trial are the payoﬀs of
the ambiguous lottery and the payoﬀs and probabilities of payoﬀs of the risky lottery.
Two of the frequently used models for discrete repeated measurements of experimental outcomes are: mixed eﬀects models, used extensively in econometrics to
estimate individual specific parameters, and marginal models, where the regression
coeﬃcients are population parameters of subgroups. For a lucid discussion of the relative merits and limitations of the two approaches we recommend the lecture notes
of Fitzmaurice published in power point on the internet under the title: Applied
Longitudinal Analysis: Contrasting Marginal and Mixed Eﬀects Models.
General estimating equations or  is a widely used methodology in biostatistics
for estimating the population-specific parameters in a marginal model. The 
approach has a number of appealing properties for estimation of the regression coefficients in marginal models. First, we need only make assumptions on the first two
moments of the distribution of the vector of responses. The  estimates of the
regression coeﬃcients are consistent and asymptotically normal, where the covariance
matrix is consistently estimated using a sandwich estimator, even if the within subject associations among the repeated measurements have been misspecified. In many
cases,  is almost as eﬃcient as maximum likelihood estimation. We interpret
the parameters in the marginal model as population averages in a given group.
There is an important diﬀerence between the application of longitudinal analysis
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to neuroimaging data, where the within-subject association of responses is considered
a nuisance and our application of longitudinal analysis. In our experiment, subjects
make a sequence of binary choices between risky and ambiguous binary lotteries. For
paired binary data, Lipsitz et al. (1991) introduced odds ratios as a measure of the
within-subject association of binary responses. We use alternating logistic regression
(), as proposed by Carey et al. (1993), with constant log odds ratios () as
the within-subject association of responses in each phase of the sequence of binary
choices to estimate the regression equations for both the first and second moments
of the marginal model. In  the within-subject association of responses is not a
nuisance for our model, but an essential part of the longitudinal analysis. It is the
within-subject association of responses as log odds that allows us to test for fictive
learning in the revealed preferences derived from the dependent, clustered responses
of subjects.
We define fictive learning for each group as statistically significant changes in
the responses of subjects before and after exposure to in the learning phase of the
experiment. In each group, we estimate a constant () of the odds of choosing the
risky lottery in a trial in the post-learning phase, conditional on the choice in a trial
in the pre-learning phase. Our null hypotheses is the absence of fictive learning in the
learning phase for each group. For the treatment group, we reject the null hypothesis
that the , is zero, i.e., there is fictive learning in the learning phase. This finding
is significant at the 1% level. The significant fictive learning in the treatment group,
given the sample data in the learning phase is as expected. The surprising finding
in our experiment is that we also reject the null hypothesis that the between
trials in the pre and post learning phases in the control group, is also zero, i.e.,
there is fictive learning in the learning phase for the control group. We expected no
fictive learning for the control group. Again the finding is significant at the 1% level.
A possible but problematic explanation of the choice behavior of the control group
is apophenia: “seeing meaningful patterns in meaningless or random data.” For an
evolutionary rational of this type of behavior, see Shermer’s article “Patternicity:
Finding Meaningful Patterns in Meaningless Noise” in Scientific American
(2008).
Whatever subjects in the two groups “learn” in the treatment phase, we can ask
if the eﬀects of the treatments are significantly diﬀerent between groups. To compare
the eﬀects of the treatment phase in each group, we use the log-odds-ratio test proposed in chapter 10 of Fleiss et al. (2004). The analysis begins with the calculation of
whatever the subjects in the two groups “learn” from the treatment phase, then we
ask if the eﬀects of the two treatments are significantly diﬀerent. The null hypothesis
is that the , between trials in the pre and post learning phases, in the treatment
group and the , between trials in the pre and post learning phases, in the control
group are equal. We reject the null at the 1% level. That is, the fictive learning in the
two groups produced significantly diﬀerent choices in the post learning phase relative
to the choices in the pre-learning phase. See the working paper for details. A more
dramatic illustration of the diﬀerent eﬀects of fictive learning in the two groups are
the box plots in figure 1. That is, if we plot the amount of time where the ambiguous
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lottery is chosen in each phase of the experiment then the curve is a piece-wise linear
concave function for the treatment group and a piece-wise linear convex function for
the control group.

Figure 1
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Experimental Protocols

To test for the presence of fictive learning in revealed preferences for risk and ambiguity, we propose an experiment on revealed preferences for choices under uncertainty,
consisting of 36 Yale undergraduates as subjects randomly chosen from the 2011 Yale
Fall term. Each subject makes a sequence of 100 binary choices between risky and
ambiguous lotteries. Risky lotteries are defined as lotteries where the relative frequencies of outcomes are known. Ambiguous lotteries are lotteries where the relative
frequencies of outcomes are unknown.
The experiment is divided into three phases. Subjects face the same sequence of
30 binary choices between risky and ambiguous lotteries in the first and third phase
of the experiment. That is, the trials in phase 1 and phase 3 are clustered matchedpairs, but the lotteries in phase 1 and 3 for the two groups are independent. To
4

test for fictive learning, we reveal to each subject the outcomes of her 40 actual and
counterfactual choices in phase 2 In the treatment group, the relative frequencies
of counterfactual ambiguous outcomes in phase 2 are relatively easy to learn, using
sample averages of the outcomes of the ambiguous lotteries. In the control group,
the relative frequencies of counterfactual ambiguous outcomes in phase 2 are quite
diﬃcult, if not impossible, to learn, since the sample averages do not converge. See
the working paper for a formal proof. The binary choices in phase 2 are the same in
both groups and independent of the binary choices in phases 1 and 3 Subjects are
unaware that they will be exposed to counterfactual outcomes in phase 2 before they
are presented binary choices in phase 3. In particular, subjects do not know if the
relative frequencies of outcomes of ambiguous lotteries in phase 2 is a sample average
of the probabilities of ambiguous outcomes in phase 1 and 3. In fact, they are in the
treatment group, but not in the control group.
No outcomes are revealed to subjects in the first and third phase of the experiments. The lotteries are displayed as pie graphs on each subject’s computer screen.
Probabilities for the risky lotteries are displayed. The probabilities determining the
payoﬀs of ambiguous lotteries are constant in phase 1 and phase 3 of both experiments, but never revealed to the subjects. We randomly vary the placement and
colors of the lotteries on the computer screen to control for positional bias. We randomly choose one group of 17 students from the 36 students as the treatment group.
At the end of the experiment, a trial is randomly chosen for each subject and the
subject is given the payoﬀ of her choice.
We define fictive learning for each group as statistically significant changes in
the responses of subjects before and after exposure to outcomes in phase 2 of the
experiment. In each group, we estimate a constant log odds ratio () of the odds
of choosing the risky lottery in a trial in phase , conditional on the choice in a trial
in phase . We use    in  with the  option to estimate the
regression equations for both the first and second moments of the marginal model.
We assume the  is constant in phase 1; phase 2; phase 3; between phases 1 and
2; between phases 1 and 3 and between phases 2 and 5. In , the odds ratio for
each pair of trials is
 (  = 1;   = 1) (  = 0;   = 0)
=
 (  = 1;   = 0) (  = 0;   = 1)

 ( =1| =1)
 ( =0| =1)
 ( =1| =0)
 ( =0| =0)

where  is the subject index and  and  are the indices of the trials.  = 1 means
subject  choose the risky lottery in trial .
The recruiting poster and informed consent form are attached as appendices.
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A Marginal Analysis of Fictive Learning

In Ellsberg’s well-known two-color paradox (1961), where the risky and the ambiguous
urn have the same payoﬀs, optimistic subjects choose the ambiguous urn, where
the relative proportions of the black and white balls are unknown, and pessimistic
5

subjects choose the risky urn, where the relative proportions of the black and white
balls are known. Recently, Bracha and Brown (2012) introduced aﬀective utilities
where optimistic subjects are endowed with a convex aﬀective utility function and
pessimistic subjects are endowed with a concave aﬀective utility function. In their
model  is a proxy for risk-aversion and  is a proxy for ambiguity-aversion. The
concavity (convexity) of the utility functions in this class of non-expected utility
functions depends on the ratio of  and  In our model we restrict attention to the
parametric class of linear-quadratic concave (convex) utility functions introduced by
Rockafellar (1987).
This is the technical section of the working paper and we limit our exposition to
a discussion of the results and refer the reader to the working paper for technical
details, such as proofs. We denote risky lotteries as  and ambiguous lotteries as  ,
where
 ≡ (1  2 ;  1   2 ) and  ≡ (1  2 )
Subjects evaluate risky lotteries, , using expected utility:
 ( ()) ≡  1  (1 ) +  2  (2 )
where the Bernoulli utility function.
 () ≡   +

 2
 and  is the proxy for risk-aversion.
2

If
 (1 ) =  1 +

 2

1 and  (2 ) =  2 + 22
2
2

then


[ 1 21 +  2 22 ]
2
Subjects evaluate ambiguous lotteries,  , using aﬀective utility:
 (()) =  ( 1 1 +  2 2 ) +

 ( ) ≡  (1 + 2 )+

[ − ] 2
[1 + 22 ]
2

In the parametric specification of  ( ), the aﬀective utility of the ambiguous
lottery  ,  is the proxy for risk-aversion and  is the proxy for ambiguity-aversion
In each binary choice between a risky and an ambiguous lottery, we assume that
subjects choose the lottery that maximizes random utility, where the parametric
nonrandom components of the random utility of a risky and an ambiguous lottery
are  ( ()) and  ( ). These are linear-quadratic multivariate functions.
The important technical aspect of the linear-quadratic formulation is that for any pair
of risky and ambiguous lotteries, the diﬀerence in the expected utility of the risky
lottery and the aﬀective utility of the ambiguous lottery is linear in the parameters.
The binary discrete choice model is a generalized linear model where the link function
is a cdf. In this paper, the link function is the logistic cdf. The argument of the link
function is the diﬀerence of the parametric nonrandom components of the random
utility of a risky and an ambiguous lottery. If the nonrandom component of the
6

random utility function is linear in the parameters, then the log-likelihood is strictly
concave in the parameters defining the nonrandom components of the random utility
function.
Φ(     ) the argument of the logistic cdf, is the diﬀerence of the expected
utility of the risky lottery  = (1  2 ;  1   2 ) and the aﬀective utility of the ambiguous lottery  = (1  2 ). Hence the choice probability for ,  (     ) is
implicitly defined by the logistic cdf
Λ[Φ] ≡

exp Φ
1 + exp Φ

where
Φ(     ) ≡ log

 (     )
= [ ( ()) −  ( ( ))]
1 −  (     )

is the log-odds of choosing 
[ ( ()) −  ( ( ))]
½
¾

[ − ] 2
2
2
2
[1 + 2 ]
=  ( 1 1 +  2 2 ) + [ 1 1 +  2 2 ] −  (1 + 2 ) +
2
2
 (     ) =

exp[  () −  ( ( ))]
(1 + exp[  () −  ( ( ))])

 (     ) is the explicit probability of choosing the risky lottery  in the
pair-wise comparison between the risky lottery  and the ambiguous lottery  . In
each experiment, let  = 1 if the risky lottery is chosen by subject  in trial  and
0 otherwise, then the density of  is
[ (     )] [1 −  (     )]1−
We estimate the regression parameters for each phase of the experiment:
  ≡ (1  2  3 ;  1   2   3 ; 1  2  3 ; 1  2  3 ) ∈ 12
in the marginal model, using generalized estimating equations (). Our primary reference is the monograph on applied longitudinal analysis by Fitzmaurice et
al. (2011). See the working paper for details.
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Table 1. Analysis of GEE Parameter Estimates: Treatment Group
Standard
95% confidence
Estimates
error
limits

Pr  ||
1
21074
03118
14863
27186
676  00001
2
14113
02397
09416
18810
589  00001
3
17255
02616
12127
22383
659  00001
1
−00955
00172 −01292 −00617 −554  00001
2
−00507
00125 −00752 −00261 −404  00001
3
−00697
00150 −00992 −00402 −464  00001
1
08134
01418
05355
10914
574  00001
2
06000
01217
03615
08385
493  00001
3
06250
01303
03695
08804
480  00001
1
−00206
00072 −00347 −00065 −287  00041
2
−00103
00068 −00236
00030 −151  01300
3
−00090
00071 −00229
00048 −128  02016
Table 2. Analysis of GEE
Standard
Estimates
error
1
16809
03058
2
14511
02580
3
14122
03367
1
−00661
00156
2
−00525
00147
3
−00526
00172
1
07642
01503
2
06261
01408
3
00587
01821
1
−00195
00080
2
−00134
00083
3
−00094
00099

Parameter Estimates:
95% confidence
limits
10815
22803
09454
19568
07513
20711
−00966 −00355
−00813 −00238
−00863 −00189
04697
10587
03501
09022
02117
09256
−00351 −00039
−00296
00028
−00287
00100

Control Group

550
562
419
−424
−358
−306
509
445
312
−244
−162
−095

Pr  ||
 00001
 00001
 00001
 00001
 00003
 00022
 00001
 00001
 00018
 00145
 01055
 03442

In the working paper, we show that the estimated parameter values are consistent
with the concavity and monotonicity of the Bernoulli utilities of wealth and consistent
with the convexity and monotonicity of the aﬀective utility for each group. That is,
both the treatment group and the control group are (on average) risk-averse, but
both groups are (on average) optimistic.
The odds ratio in  is
 (  = 1;   = 1) (  = 0;   = 0)
=
 (  = 1;   = 0) (  = 0;   = 1)
∙

 (  = 1;   = 1) (  = 0;   = 0)
 (  = 1;   = 0) (  = 0;   = 1)
8

¸−1

 ( =1| =1)
 ( =0| =1)
 ( =1| =0)
 ( =0| =0)

=

 ( =1| =0)
 ( =0| =0)
 ( =1| =1)
 ( =0| =1)

where  is the subject index and  and  are the indices of the trials.  = 1 means
the subject choose the risky lottery in trial . We assume the  is constant in
phase 1; phase 2; phase 3; between phases 1 and 2; between phases 1 and 3 and
between phases 2 and 5. In the following tables for the treatment and control groups,
the estimated constant  are denoted Alpha  for  = 1 2  5. We test the null
hypothesis 0 : the log odds ratio is equal to zero, against the alternative hypothesis
 : the log odds ratio is unequal to zero. Here are the estimates for the log-odds
ratios.
Table 3. Analysis of GEE Parameter Estimates: LOR for the Treatment Group
Standard
95% confidence
Estimates
error
limits

Pr  ||
1 (Phase 1)
−00096
00468 −01013
00822 −020
08381
2 (Phase 2)
01124
00641 −00132
02380
175
00796
3 (Phase 3)
00334
00379 −01077
00408 −088
03778
4 (Phase 1 & 2)
00208
00376 −00529
00944
055
05803
5 (Phase 1 & 3)
01057
00389
00293
01820
271
00067
6 (Phase 2 & 3)
00112
00454 −00778
01003
025
08046
Table 4. Analysis of GEE Parameter Estimates: LOR for the
Standard
95% confidence
Estimates
error
limits
1 (Phase 1)
01217
00744 −00242
02675
2 (Phase 2)
−00463
00222 −00898 −00027
3 (Phase 3)
01349
00832 −00282
02980
4 (Phase 1 & 2) −00061
00304 −00656
00535
5 (Phase 1 & 3)
02051
00779
00525
03577
6 (Phase 2 & 3) −00239
00303 −00833
00356

Control Group

164
−208
162
−020
263
−079

Pr  ||
01020
00374
01050
08420
00084
04315

Alpha 2 and Alpha 5 are the only significant statistics in each group. The 
in phase 2 of the control group
 (  = 1 |   = 1)
 (  = 1 |   = 0)

 (  = 0 |   = 0)
 (  = 0 |   = 1)
and the  in phase 2 of the treatment group is
 (  = 1 |   = 0)
 (  = 1 |   = 1)


 (  = 0 |   = 1)
 (  = 0 |   = 0)
For Alpha 5, the  between phase 1 and phase 3 in each experiment is
 (  = 1 |   = 1)
 (  = 1 |   = 0)


 (  = 0 |   = 1)
 (  = 0 |   = 0)

9

4

Acknowledgements

The WhiteBox Foundation and SOM provided generous financial support for our
experiments for several summers. Le-Minh Ho was a truly exceptional RA. Finally
we wish to thank our colleagues and graduate students for their ongoing interest in
this project. This paper is a revision of CFDP 1890.

References
[1] Boorman, Erie D., Timothy E. Behrens, and Matthew F. Rushworth (2011).
“Counterfactual Choice and Learning in a Neural Network Centered on Human
Lateral Frontopolar Cortex.”
[2] Bracha, A., and D. J. Brown (2013). “Keynesian Utilities: Bulls and Bears,”
CFDP 1898.
[3] Bunn, O., C. Calsamiglia, and D.J. Brown (2013). “Testing for Fictive Learning
in Decision-Making under Uncertainty,” CFDP 1890.
[4] Carey, V., S.L. Zeger and P. Diggle (1993). “Modelling Multivariate Binary Data
with Alternating Logistic Regressions,” Biometrika, 517—526.
[5] Ellsberg, D., (1961). “Risk, Ambiguity and the Savage Axioms,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 643—669.
[6] Fitzmaurice, Garrett M., Nan M. Laird, James H. Ware (2011). Applied Longitudinal Analysis (Wiley Series in Probability and Statistics).
[7] Fleiss, Joseph L., Bruce Levin, and Myunghee Cho Paik (2003). Statistical Methods for Rates and Proportions, Third Edition, John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
[8] Hayden, Benjamin Y., John M. Pearson, and Michael L. Platt (2009). “Fictive
Reward Signals in Anterior Cingulate Cortex,” Science, 948—950.
[9] Huettel, Scott A., C. Jill Stowe, Evan M. Gordon, Brent T. Warner, and Michael
L. Plat (2006). “Neural Signatures of Economic Preferences for Risk and Ambiguity,” Neuron 49, 765—775.
[10] Keynes, J.M. (1937). “The General Theory of Employment,” Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 209—223.
[11] Levy I„ J. Snell, A.J. Nelson, A. Rustichini, and P.W. Glimcher (2010). “Neural
Representation of Subjective Value under Risk and Ambiguity,” Journal of Neurophysiology, 1036—1047.
[12] Li, Yimei, Hongtu Zhua Lia, Hongtu, Yasheng Chenb, Hongyu, John Gilmorec,
Weili Lin and Dinggang Shenb (2009) “STGEE: Longitudinal Analysis of Neuroimaging Data"Proceeding,” Proceeding of the SPIE.
10

[13] Liang, K.-Y. and S.L. Zeger (1986). “Longitudinal Data Analysis Using Generalized Linear Models,” Biometrika, 13—22.
[14] Lipsitz, Stuart R., Nan M. Lair and David P. Harrington (1991). “Generalized
Estimating Equations for Correlated Binary Data: Using the Odds Ratio as a
Measure of Association,” Biometrika, 153—160.
[15] Lohrenz, Terry, Kevin McCabe, Colin F. Camerer, and P. Read Montague
(2006). “Neural Signature of Fictive Learning Signals in a Sequential Investment
Task,” PNAS, 9493-9498.
[16] Platt, M., and Hayden,B. (2011). “Learning: Not Just the Facts, Ma’am, but
the Counterfactuals as Well,” PLoS Biol 9(6): e1001092..
[17] Rockafellar, R.T. (1987). “Linear-Quadratic Programming and Optimal Control,” SIAM J. Control and Opt., 781—814.
/

11

If you want to try your luck, don’t go to Foxwoods. Join us
in a 75minute research experiment on decisionmaking
under uncertainty, i.e. gambling.
Our games are rigged in your favor: You will receive $8 for participating. In addition,
you have a chance to win between $2 and $15 during the experiment.
You can participate in the experiment at one of the following five times:
1. Tuesday, October 25, at 3pm,
2. Tuesday, October 25, at 4.30pm,
3. Tuesday, October 25, at 7pm,
4. Wednesday, October 26, at 2pm,
5. Wednesday, October 26, at 7pm.
In order to be eligible for participation, you must:




be at least 19 years old,
be enrolled at Yale in the fall term 2011,
NOT be taking a course from Professor Donald Brown or Professor Laurie
Santos in the fall term 2011.

If you meet the above requirements and would like to participate, please contact
Donald Brown at donald.brown@yale.edu or Oliver Bunn at oliver.bunn@yale.edu
and specify your preference with regard to the time of the experiment (choices 1‐5
above).
The principal investigator for this study is Professor Donald Brown, HSC #1104008396.

Decision Making Under Uncertainty
Experimental Study Performed at Yale University
Principal Investigator: Professor Donald J. Brown
IRB Protocol Number: 1104008396

Research Informed Consent Form
This is a research experiment on decision‐making under uncertainty. Although this
study will not benefit you personally, we hope that our results will add to the
knowledge about sequential decision‐making under risk and ambiguity.
This is a 75‐minute experiment where you will be asked to make 100 pair‐wise
choices between lotteries with two outcomes. In some lotteries you will be told the
probabilities of the outcomes and for other lotteries you will not be told the
probabilities of the outcomes. The experiment is divided into 3 blocks. At the end of
each block, you can take a break at your own discretion.
You may leave the experiment at anytime and we will pay you $8. At the end of the
experiment you will you will earn additional dollars from your choices. That is, if
you complete the experiment, then we will randomly select one of your 100 choices
and you will also receive the payoff of that choice. The payoffs range from $2 to $15.
All of your responses will be confidential. Your responses will be numbered and any
information linking your number with your name will be destroyed at the end of the
experiment, after you are paid. This anonymous data will be available upon request
to other social scientists.

Page 1 of 2

To participate in this experiment you must be at least 19 years old. The risks of this
study include fatigue or mild stress. These risks are no greater than those found in
taking a 75 minute midterm exam.
If you have any questions about this study, you may contact the investigator,
Professor Donald Brown at donald.brown@yale.edu. If you would like to talk to
someone other than the researchers to discuss problems or concerns, to discuss
situations in the event that a member of the research team is not available, or to
discuss your rights as a research participant, you may contact the Yale University
Human Subjects Committee, Box 208010, New Haven, CT 06520‐8010, 203‐785‐
4688, human.subjects@yale.edu.
If you wish to participate in this study, please sign the consent form.

____________________________________________
Signature of Study Participant

________________________________
Date of the Study

PERSONAL COPY OF STUDY PARTICIPANT

Page 2 of 2

